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The early twentieth century was a time of tremendous change for the Philippines when American 
rule, liberal democracy and capitalism, introduced a generation of Filipinos to a new world.  As they 
navigated their way through the era they faced new sets of challenges.  While some practices were 
reconciled with the modern ways, others had to yield to changing times. Among those affected was the 
relationship of landlords and their share tenants. 
In Nueva Ecija, a province in Central Luzon, while internal defects of share tenancy already caused 
landlord-tenant relations to deteriorate, external factors added pressure to the already volatile situation. 
These factors were: economic instability, consumerism, pricecontrol, open government support to 
peasants, class consciousness and labor leaders. The paper shall evaluate the confluence of the defects 
of share tenancy and the external factors that led to agrarian unrest in the province during the prewar 
era.  It will also assess the impact of changing times on landlordism in the Philippines. 
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Landlordism in the Philippines was rooted in share-tenancy, locally known as the kasamá system.  
In The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, Benedict J. Kerkvliet found that at one 
time, tenants in the Philippines considered the system to be judicious.  The paternalistic character of the 
relationship wasregarded to be mutually beneficial for while the tenants’ subordination was 
compensated by privileges extended by the landlords such as the right to farm a plot of land and loans of 
rice, the landlords benefitted from the tenants’ acceptance of requests for odd jobs and loyalty that 
swelled the landlords’ status and political power.1 
This patron-client relationship deteriorated when the attitude of next generation landlords 
changed. They started treating their tenants as mere employees to whom their only obligation was to 
hand over the proper share of the harvest.2When customary privileges were withdrawn the kasamá 
system became exploitative in the eyes of the tenants, which caused dissatisfaction.   
It must also be considered that at the turn of the 20thcentury, the Philippines became an American 
colony. The introduction of liberal democracy, American values and capitalism led to drastic changes in 
the cultural,ethical, intellectual and political climate. As the norms adjusted to the times, customary 
relations were maintained but new meanings were assigned to traditional roles.3  Such change was also 
brought on by forces such as the world wars, economic instability, and socialism, among others.  These 
were factors that were external to thekasamá system that also added pressure on landlord and tenant 
relations. It may thus be said that the confluence of internal defects and external pressures ultimately 
resulted to the breakdown of the kasamá system which led to agrarian unrest in the province during the 
prewar era. 
BACKGROUND 
Nueva Ecija is a province in the Central Luzon region.  Throughout most of the twentieth century it 
was the “Rice Granary” of the Philippines.The province had not always been devoted to rice 
productionfor throughout most of its history, it was a frontier area. It was only during the mid-
nineteenth century that its vast plains were transformed into rice fields.4It was in 1920 that the province 
became the top rice producerand thus the “Rice Granary” of the islands.5 
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While the title of “Rice Granary” may suggest tremendous prosperity for the province,it was not 
the case. In fact, the 1920s-1930swas referred to as “a period of starvation amidst plenty.”6  One reason 
for this was the tremendous difference between the prices given the rice growers and the prices in the 
markets, a situation attributed to the manipulation by middlemen and rice merchants.  Price fluctuation 
from season to season and from month to month also placed the “consumer and small producer 
completely at the mercy of the weather and the middlemen.”7 Leon Ma. Guerrero thus noted in 1938, 
“The price of rice is not a figure for the statistical reports, but a matter of life and death.” 
“If the price of rice goes up, 14,000,000 people know it.  They have to pay more for life, 
they go hungry to bed or school.” 
“If the price of rice goes down, then 4,000,000 landowners, tenants and ricemill laborers 
face ruin.  Landowners tighten up on credit, and the tenant goes deeper into debt. 
“If the price goes up, hunger.” 
“If the price goes down, revolution.” 
“Of all Filipino industries, rice is the most important in terms of life.”8 
A similar opinion was expressed in the column “The Rice Farmer” of the Herald published on 
September 28, 1935, which conveyed a cynical view of the industry.  The author wrote, 
It is the misfortune of the rice producer that the stomach of the people is the regulator 
of the business.  To speculate on that stomach is a highly dangerous venture. The copra 
manufacturer, the hemp planter, the sugar hacenderos may speculate all they want, but never 
the planter of rice. 
The nation rejoices when copra, hemp and sugar prices are high; to the nation, if 
Providence grants it, the sky is the limit when it comes to the prices of these speculative crops.  
But in the matter of rice- the food of the public Minotaur- the limit is the common earth.9 
The statement reveals an aspect of the rice industry that seems to have been generally ignored.  
That is, as the provider of the nation’s food staple there was a deemed ethical dimension to its existence.   
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Because rice was considered a basic necessity, its commerce was believed to be “a matter of life and 
death.”  For this reason market forces were not allowed to govern the industry completely and the trade 
of rice was regulated by the government despite opposition from various sectors.  The policy favored the 
urban consumers rather than the rice producers which consequently led to meager profitsin an industry 
that seemed to be booming.10 
This scenario affected both landowners and their tenants. But while landlords in general were able 
bear the brunt of low profit from rice production by extending interest bearing loans, the tilling class had 
difficulty making ends meet and got deeper in debt.  The situation in Nueva Ecija eventually led to the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the few while the majority of the people suffered in abject 
poverty.  This was the situation when social upheavals that lasted throughout the rest of the twentieth 
century erupted in the province.   
In 1936, the Department of Labor conducted a fact-finding survey of rural problems and found 
that Nueva Ecija was the scene of more land conflicts than any other province. It was also the province 
with the greatest number of private haciendas (large landholdings).11  Furthermore, newspaper reports 
from 1930 to 1941 also show that Nueva Ecija had one of the highest incidences of peasant unrest 




Paternalism and Rebellion 
The kasamásystem” involved a landowner who leased his land to a tenant on shares.  Under ideal 
circumstances, landlord and tenant “each addressed the other as ‘kasamá’, partner, and shared a 
relation of mutual respect and trust, in which each was ready to provide resources the other lacked.”13 In 
common practice, the division of the crop at harvest was determined by the items contributed to 
production. When the landowner provided the land, work animals and seed; and the share tenant his 
labor, the crop was equally divided at harvest after advances had been deducted.  There were instances 
when the crop was also divided into three.  One-third was given for labor, another third for the work 
animal and the remainder for the land.  If the tenant owned the work animal he got two thirds of the rice 
crop and the landowner one third, and vice versa.14 Thus, in the kasamá system both landowner and 
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tenant were interested in the size of the crop produced because they shared in profit or loss.15  It was 
estimated that 75 percent of rice cultivated in the Philippines was grown under the kasamásystem 
during the 1920s.16 
 Hugo Miller observed that “in some regions and under certain circumstances the share tenants 
are comparatively free in action, in others, they are to a greater or less extent under the direction and 
supervision of the landlord, not only in matters pertaining to the tilling of the soil, but in family and 
everyday affairs.”17 He went on to construe that the system was “as much social as economic in its 
origin,” that the share tenant was part of a socio-economic system that seldom changed his status, and 
that it was the social relation of the kasamá to his landlord that accounted for the persistence of the 
system. He also pointed out that in Central Luzon, the landlord exercised control most effectively and the 
tenant was correspondingly dependent.18 More than just a socio-economic system, the kasamá system 
was therefore also a power relationship where the landlord exercised paternalistic authority over the 
tenant.   
Kerkvliet assessed the correlation between high levels of tenancy and peasant unrest.  He found 
that in the Census of the Philippines of 1939, the provinces where tenancy was highest were Pampanga, 
Negros Occidental, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan, respectively.  Except for Negros Occidental, the provinces 
with the highest tenancy rates were the core of peasant unrest and were also located in Central Luzon.19 
Based on testimonies of villagers from Nueva Ecija he went on to construe that unrest during the 
1930s was foremost the result of the breakdown of the paternal relations between landlords and 
tenants in Central Luzon.20He concluded that the desire for traditional patronage actually mattered more 
than mere high rates of tenancy.  However there are some details in Kerkvliet’s findings that require 
careful examination.   
First, Kerkvliet did not distinguish the tenancy systemsthat prevailed in the provinces with high 
tenancy. For example, the census did not indicate that while the kasamá system was prevalent in Central 
Luzon, the hacienda system was common in Negros Occidental.21  Peasant unrest in Central Luzon and 
the lack of it in Negros Occidental may thus have been rootedin the type of tenancy systems there. 
Second, while Kerkvliet observed that the provinces with high rates of tenancy were also the core 
of peasant unrest, except for Negros Occidental, he did not infer a possible correlation between unrest 
and kind of crops produced in those provinces. While rice was the main product in the provinces with 
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unrest and where the kasamá system prevailed, Negros Occidental plantations were dedicated to sugar.  
It is also worth noting that while Nueva Ecija was the principal rice growing province of the Philippines in 
the 1930s, it was also the “scene of more land conflicts than any other province.”22 
The present study therefore humbly maintains that the attribution of conflicts solely to the 
deterioration of paternal relations between landlords and tenants may be limited and that the root of 
conflict is the intrinsic defects of the kasamá system itself.   
Defects of the Kasamá system 
Landlords and tenants looked after their own interests.  While the landlord regarded the tenant as 
a “natural and easy means of getting his land worked,” the tenant looked upon the landlord as a 
business benefactor.  The landlord thus tried to get as much out of the tenant as he could, to keep him 
indebted and contented so that he will not leave.  The tenant on the other hand wanted to get as many 
advances as he could and to work as little as possible.23 
But while the kasamá system was nonetheless considered mutually beneficial, it was really a 
system designed to advance inequity in favor of the landowning class.  Though landlords conducted 
themselves within what was permissible in the system, they intentionally or not, promoted their 
interests at the expense of the share tenants.  Accounts have shown that the kasamá system was 
plagued with inherent evils that caused the oppression of the peasants of the province.  James Allen thus 
noted that exploitation was part of the system itself.24 What follows are the defects of the system. 
Social Inequity 
The system perpetuated social inequity.  For instance, most if not all items of production were 
provided by the landlord and these items were all forms of capital.  Earnings from rice production were 
therefore value added to existing wealth.   For the share tenant whose input was mainly labor, any 
earning was essentially a compensation for efforts exerted.  It was the classic relationship of capital and 
labor, and the system was designed to increase the gap of wealth. For some, the set up may be deemed 
unfair, considering the large share the landlord received relative to the actual effort contributed in the 
rice production process.   
Furthermore, the kasamá system was designed for the landlord and tenant to share in profit or 
loss because their shares were fixed percentages. Whatever the volume of the crop, both received a 
fixed proportion of the harvest.  This meant that the ratio of earnings would always be the same 
regardless of crop size. Given the set up, the share tenant would never equal his landlord’s wealth 
regardless of his efforts.  This perpetuated poverty among the tenant class for there was no incentive for 
exerting extra effort.  Thus it was observed that “the tenant has no chance to get ahead of the game 
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unless he is given a larger share of the crop than he produces or unless usury or “gouging” are 
eliminated.”25 
Dependence 
The system also fostered dependence on the landlords.  Because the relationship was between 
two parties who were of unequal wealth and education, it was normal for those who had less to develop 
some dependence on those who had more. For this reason the relationship was often likened to that of 
father and child.  It was hence common for landlords to provide guidance in farming, advice on personal 
matters and even the basic needs of the tenants.   
In an article published in 1937, Percy Hill explained that in Nueva Ecija “the patent inequality of 
the landlord-tenant contracts lies in the fact that the position of the landlord is made stable by property, 
while the tenant has only his brawn. Hence the paternalism of the ancient system, which advanced 
subsistence.”26 
 
Infringement of Liberties 
In being dependent, the tenants surrendered themselves to the landlords and allowed the latter 
to exercise control over their lives. In theFact Finding Survey Reportof 1936 it was found that share 
tenants in general did not enjoy “constitutional and inalienable civil and political rights.”27  It noted 
evidences of violations of such rights in Nueva Ecija.  
Such violations could be found even in tenancy contracts.  One that was used in the town of 
Aliagacompelled church attendance and work at fixed times by the tenants and their children, forbade 
the entrance of visitors, cutting of trees and bamboo, and also imposed fines of two to four cavans of 
palay for violations of the regulations.28 
Another contract used at the Sabani Estate was described as “reasonable on the whole” but still 
included a provision for the “renunciation of the ‘aparcero’s’ (share tenant) rights to improvements and 
damages and the taking away of the land from him under any circumstances, without lot (?) or 
hindrance.”29 
A lease contract used at Talavera dictated the “canon” of twelve cavans per hectare that was to be 
delivered to the lessor’s warehouse at Cabanatuan.  It provided for compulsory labor without 
                                                          
25
Julian Balmaseda, “Agricultural Credit in the Philippines in its Different Stages,” The Philippine Agricultural Review 
21 no.4 (Fourth Quarter 1928): 419. 
 
26














compensation in the construction and repair of dams and irrigation ditches.  All improvements were to 
remain part of the land.  The lessee was also “obliged to pay to the lessor all the expenses incurred by 
the latter to enforce his rights” under the contract, while no provision was made for the enforcement of 
the lessee’s rights.  It was thus described as a one-sided contract.30 
Insecurity 
Another defect was that it caused insecurity among tenants.  Because there was no mechanism for 
security of tenure in the kasamá system, it allowed landlords to evict tenants any time and for any 
reason.  As a consequence, the tenants lived in “perpetual fear of eviction.”  It was later identified to 
have been the “most persistent immediate cause of agrarian conflict.”31  Later legislation would also 
show that this was one of the most objectionable features of the kasamá system. For tenants, the threat 
of eviction was a constant “sword of Damocles” that served as a reminder of their dependence on the 
landlord.   
 
Indebtedness 
The most notorious aspect of the kasamá system was its having been a system of wealth 
extraction in the form of a usurious credit system.  Marshall S. McLennan even observed in, The Central 
Luzon Plain: Land and Society on the Inland Frontier, that the practices of landlords in Nueva Ecija had 
“all the earmarks of rent capitalism”which he defined as “the elaboration of mechanisms that place the 
peasant cultivator or artisan in debt to the gentryclass.”32 
 It was clear that rent capitalism prevailed in the province.  In fact it seems that the primary 
inherent evil of the kasamá system was how it kept the tenant in debt to the extent that he became 
perpetually bonded to the landlord.  As Karl J. Pelzer also pointed out,  
It is to the advantage of the landlord to have the tenant indebted to him, not only 
because of the high interest rates but also because then the tenant may be forced to do all 
kinds of extra work and may not leave his holding.  The debt binds the tenant to the land and 
makes him almost a slave of the landlord . . .33 
This aspect of the kasamá system was the most commonly cited reason for the uprisings that 
erupted in Nueva Ecija during the 1920s and 1930s.  
In 1940, the United States High Commissioner reported that disagreements between landlords 
and tenants in several provinces in Central Luzon persisted and became more serious during the year.  
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While he saw the unrest as the result of the activities of agitators, he also recognized such unrest to have 
been the consequence of landlords’ actions.34 
The kasáma system thus ceased to be regarded as a partnership based on mutual respect, trust 
and support.  Brian Fegan argued that reinforced by socialist ideas, the peasants started viewing the 
landowners as exploiters.35  In place of the patron client relationship, Michael Connoly, SJ said that,  
they substituted a radical ideology that argued that the landowner had illegally grabbed the 
land by fraud and trickery; that big inquilinos had come by their capital by charging usurious 
rates of interest for loans and undervaluing debt payments in kind; that share tenants had paid 
both the value of the land and principal on loans many times over, yet the burden of debt grew 
continually because of the unfair rates of interest.  The conclusion they drew was that they 
should “take the land, refuse to pay more rent, and renounce their debts.”36 
 The kasamá system therefore brought social inequity, dependence, infringement of basic 
liberties, insecurity and indebtedness. Because such was intrinsic in the system, the deterioration of the 
relationship between landlords and tenants was inevitable.  These inherent evils caused the share 
tenants’ dissatisfaction whichled to unrest. But, while these defects broke down the relationship, 
external pressures were also at play.  
EXTERNAL PRESSURES  
Aside from the inherently exploitative character of the kasamá system, the dissatisfaction of 
peasants that led to unrest was also rooted in events that shaped the times. These events may be 
viewed as external pressures on the already volatile landlord-tenant relationship.These events may be 
classified as economic, political and social factors. 
Economic Factors 
General Economic Instability 
During the First World War, the strong demand for Philippine raw materials by warring nations 
caused the unprecedented rise in the price of export sugar, the increase of cordage manufacturing and 
the greater demand of copra for oil.  The general prosperity that came with such demand was enjoyed 
by many and brought “a new idea of life and a vision heretofore undreamed of.”  It also led to “an 
increased desire for comforts, conveniences and a standard of living which called for money.”  However, 
the end of the war and economic readjustment were followed by a general industrial depression around 
the world which affected all Filipinos.37 
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The effects of the war can be seen in the cost of articles of prime necessities sold in public 
markets.  Prices were fairly stable from 1912-1915. By 1920 there was tremendous inflation and the 
prices of basic commodities had increased by more than a hundred percent.38 
The Secretary of Finance also reported that the outbreak of the World War gave impetus to the 
export trade of the country and “on account of which the heaviest favorable balance for a period of five 
years took place.”  The Secretary pointed out however that the year 1921 was in all respects the most 
critical period in Philippine foreign trade for in that year the unfavorable balance registered was “the 
largest figure ever recorded since American occupation.”39 
The early 1920s was clearly a time of economic instability.  Disillusionment, increased prices of 
goods and the general cost of living, as well as low wages made the period a time of great financial 
difficulty especially for the needy.  For this reason, economic instability brought a sense of dissatisfaction 
among peasants.40This explains whyagrarian unrest in Nueva Ecija and the rest of Central Luzon began in 
the early 1920s.41 
Consumerism of Philippine Society 
Prior to the American occupation, wages were very low in general and people had few needs to 
satisfy.42 It was in the twentieth century that the tremendous pressures that came with a rapidly 
commercializing society were felt. Capitalism encouraged spendingand consumerism affected even the 
peasants.43 
Progress also came with increasing literacy, more movie theaters and wellstocked shops to invite 
spending. A change in the general lifestyle affected almost everyone including the peasantry, which felt 
the need for a larger share of the products of their toil.44 Such need was however seldom satisfied, which 
caused dissatisfaction among them. 
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Another factor was the regulation of the price of rice. Despite the economic instability of the 
1920s, statistics showed the continued growth of the rice industry of Nueva Ecija well into the 1930s. As 
mentioned earlier, while the circumstances suggested that the rice producers should have enjoyed 
tremendous prosperity, it was not the case because the price of rice was regulated by the government.   
The price of rice was regulated to make the grain affordable to the general public.  The policy 
favored the urban consumers over the rice producers (both landlords and tenants).45However, 
government effort to lessen the toll of inflation made life difficult particularly for the poor rice planters.  
In fact, it was found in the investigation that followed the Sakdal Uprising of 1935, that one of the 
reasons for the unrest was that the price of rice was so low that its cultivation allowed the small farmer 
no profit.46 
By 1937, national leaders were aware of the impact of price control on the rice producers.  It was 
reported that President Manuel Quezon told the manager of the National Rice and Corn Corporation 
(NARIC) Victor Buencaminoto protect the interests of both the producers and consumers with regard 
fixing the price of palay.  The President said that “so long as the price of rice does not become a burden 
to the workingman which he can not (sic) carry without practically depriving himself of other necessities 
to life or subjecting him to an insufficient daily sustenance, the policy should be to encourage the rice 
industry by assuring it a reasonable profit that will benefit the tenants or the man working in the farms 
as well, as well as the landowners.”  In response, Buencamino assured the President that an “increase in 
the price of palay, if granted, will enable the ‘kasama’ to get a higher income for his labor and 
approximate his earnings to that of a laborer at ₱1 daily wage.”47 
However, in January 1938, Nueva Ecija rice planters still complained that “due to the decrease of 
production and the low price of rice, the price fixing move was detrimental to all concerned.”48Jose T. 
Ramos the president of the Landowners League of Nueva Ecija explained that in a bad year like then, the 
tenants bore the burden heavily.  Because the NARIC kept down the price of palay, the land owners 
made little margin from normal crops.  Over this, the operation of the tenancy law lessened the chances 
of recovery of advanced money to tenants.49 The former practice of advancing money to tenants 
therefore had to be discontinued during times of crop shortage or market depression which made the 
circumstances even more difficult for the tenants.50 
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In 1939, Buencamino noted that rice was the onlybasic commodity that did not have any increase 
in price during the “hysterical price boosting at the start of European hostilities,” referring to the 
outbreak of the Second World War in Europe.  He attributed the prevention ofany upswing in prices to 
the “stabilizing influence of the large stocks of rice kept by the Corporation,” as well as the “easy and 
even flow” of supplies to the markets.  He also said that this fact was even “more impressive when it is 
considered that prices of all other commodities have increased from 10 per cent to as high as 30 per cent 
immediately after war in Europe was declared last September.”51 
While it was good news for the country, the stability of the price of rice in light of the soaring cost 
of other commodities would again be detrimental to the rice producers.  Government regulation forced 
rice producers to bear the brunt of the 10-30 percent increase of the cost of all other commodities as 
mentioned in the statement, which again would have been most difficult for the poor farmers.  In “The 
Peasant War in the Philippines” published in 1946, it was thus stated that, 
A report of the College of Agriculture in 1939 placed the income of the rice tenant at ₱130.00 
annually on a three hectare farm.  The tenant, could indeed, increase his income by working 
outside of the farm during off seasons.  But where in our little feudal world could a tenant find 
work! His plight is unimaginable when he has a family to support.  Consider in relation to his 
income the high cost of living, the increase of wants, and the economic difficulties caused by 
the War.52 
All these circumstances explain why landowners tightened conditions of tenancy by demanding 
the strict payment of loans and by adopting elaborate mechanisms that placed peasant cultivators in 
debt.  Such practices allowed them to increase their rent yields while crop yields were restrained by 
government.  In the words of Brian Fegan, “landowners reacted to all these threats to their economic 
interests by squeezing tenants harder.”53 Such acts, although not justifiable, were the landowners’ 
means of coping with the financial pressures of the period. Ultimately, it was the poor rice farmers who 
bore the whole burden for the stability of the price of rice.   
Political and Social Factors 
Open Government Support for Peasants 
The “official favoritism shown by the government to the poor in their conflicts against the rich” 
was viewed as another cause of unrest, for such support fuelled antagonistic feelings of the tenants 
against landlords.54In preparation for national independence, the government desired an increase in the 
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number of small independent farmers as indicated by the discouragement of big landholdings in the 
Philippine Organic Act of 1902 which provided that no individual, company or corporation can buy, lease 
or operate more than 1,024 hectares of public land.55 
Homestead and inter-island migration lawsencouraged “borne-seekers” to take up homesteads 
in the public domain.56  However, the title to these small holdingspresented the greatest difficulty to the 
government.Due to the improper distribution of homestead grants, conflict of claims resulted among 
homesteaders and sometimes between them and landlords. 
It was however noted that in addressing such problems, the government tended to openly support 
the farmers.57  Government support thus gave peasants a sense of power whichemboldened them to 
challenge the landlordsas they fought for their perceived rights. 
Felix Angeles of the Red Cross who reported on conditions in Jaen, Nueva Ecija also observed a 
correlation between agrarian unrest and open government support.  He noted that too much publicity 
given to government relief funds made peasants want a share of the funds.  This happened whenever it 
was announced that the government appropriated big sums for relief.  He narrated that during his 
investigation in Jaen, his attention was called towards a local paper that carried news that the Province 
of Bulacan obtained ₱10,000 for relief, which he said agitated the people in Jaen because they wanted a 
share.58 
Open government support to tenants thus led to unrest in two ways: first, in emboldening the 
peasants to challenge the landlords and second, in causing discontent over the failure to get a share of 
government relief funds.   
Class Consciousness and Labor Leaders 
Class consciousness was another factor that led to agrarian trouble.  In pre-colonial times, the 
islands had a stratified society consisting of three classes known as the datu (rulers), maharlika/timawa 
(freemen) and alipin (dependents/slaves) classes. By the Spanish era, there was the principalia and 
kailian.  The principalia was made up of wealthy people, political office-holders and former capitanes or 
cabezas while the kailian consisted of those who had to work for their taxes. The distinction between the 
two classes was very apparent but was “accepted as the logical order of things.” There were no 
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antagonistic feelings between them and the principalia looked upon the kailian with “a parental 
interest” while “the latter was conscious of the privilege.”59 
The sense of mutuality disappeared when democracy was introduced and misunderstood by the 
common Filipino. Instead of being associated with equal opportunity for all, democracy was understood 
as equality in every way for everyone instead. Furthermore, while it seemed that socialist ideals were 
adopted by the laboring class and associations were formed with “the apparent purpose of encouraging 
mutual aid among their members,” in reality they were “designed to protect their members from the 
encroachments and injustices of the rich.”60It was thus said that a study of the social, political and 
economic forces of the conflict would demonstrate that unrest was neither a religious movement nor a 
political uprising, but a class war that endangered the political, economic and social institutions of the 
country.61 
Angeles shared a similar view of what he referred to as the share tenant’s “communistic ideals.” 
Ideals that manifested in their complaints of not being taken care of by the government, in ridiculing 
officials in power and their desire to show the failure of government in its endeavors.62  The article “Give 
us this Day . . .” on the other hand portrayed the agrarian movement as part of the world-wide 
discontent of working people under the economic-order that existed then.63  It conformed to Eric R. 
Wolf’s later observation in Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century that,  
… the peasant is an agent of forces larger than himself, forces produced by a disordered past as 
much as by a disordered present.  There is no evidence for the view that if it were not for 
“outside agitators,” the peasant would be at rest.  On the contrary, the peasants rise to redress 
wrong; but inequalities against which they rebel are but, in turn, parochial manifestations of 
great social dislocations.64 
Labor leaders and political agitators were considered to have aggravated the situation. For 
instance, Major Severo C. Cruz, provincial constabulary inspector of Pampangadeclared that many 
unscrupulous labor leaders were taking advantage of the credulity of the ignorant masses, organizing 
labor unions for two selfish motives- monetary considerations and to attract public notice.65Serafin 
Macaraig believed that labor leaders, among whom many were “unsuccessful candidates in previous 
elections,” took advantage of the growing social and political consciousness by arousing political 
enthusiasm while posing as unselfish leaders fighting against the oppression of the working man.  Felix 
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Angeles identified among the causes of unrest: dissatisfied leaders whose candidates did not win in 
elections who “fanned the flame of discontent,” as well as high expectations from victorious candidates 
to immediately improve conditions.66A special committee that investigated agrarian troubles detailed 
that the intervention of labor leaders in the personal relations of landlords and tenants caused the 
widening of the gulf between proprietors and laborers, because the labor leaders did not even know or 
were not acquainted with the problems connected with farm tenancy.67  Last, Percy Hill reported that 
considerable agrarian trouble between landlords and tenants in Bulacan, Pampanga and elsewhere were 
fomented by irresponsible labor leaders yearning for self expression and incidentally a salary attached to 
some job,according to the land-owners.68 
Macaraig explained that becausea wide gap between rich and poor did not exist at the time, there 
had never been any serious conflict between social classes.  Agitators used their time “continuously 
kindling the spirit of rebellion among our laboring classes.” Thus he accused these labor leaders of being 
more interested in trouble than the welfare of those they led.   
CHANGING TIMES 
Unrest may thus be viewed as the consequence of changing times. While the kasamá system was 
considered to be a mutually beneficial relationship during an earlier era, by the 1920s and 1930s it came 
to be regarded as unfair and oppressive.  This was where the deterioration in the paternalistic relations 
was found by Kerkvliet. 
Landlords were described as having lost the “personal touch” in their dealings and the “more 
strict, businesslike and impersonal” attitude of the younger landlords was resented by the tenants.69  A 
change in the notion of his role as a landlord was evident in an interview by Benedict J. Kerkvliet with 
Manolo Tinio, who narrated that in his childhood “the tenant-landlord system was a real paternalistic 
one.”  He explained that, 
The landlord thought of himself as a kind of grandfather to all his tenants, and so he was 
concerned with all aspects of their lives. That’s how my father, Manuel Tinio, was for instance. 
My father’s tenants thought very highly of him, too.   But that system had to change over time 
as haciendas had to be put on a more sound economic footing.  You see, the landlord-tenant 
relationship is a business partnership, not a family.  The landlord has invested capital in the 
land, and the tenants give their labor.70 
The more socially conscious peasants on the other hand also began to question paternalism itself. 
While demanded by the farmers interviewed by Kerkvliet, other peasants came to consider paternalism 


















as a social evil.  This was the perspective of Luis Taruc, leader of the peasant movement, in an interview 
by Bruce Nussbaum where he said, 
They called us “amang”, “anak”, that is, “my son”, “my daughter”, the way they dealt with us, 
so they were like parents or had a parental way of treating us which in the long run I came to 
realize it was worse because we did not want to be freed from our shackles, from our slavery, 
from that kind of landlordism just because they treated us as if we were children, which was 
just a gimmick so that we will not be discontented with their usurious practices and their 
exploitation of our labors.71 
What therefore occurred was not a change in the system but a shift in how the landlords and 
tenants perceived the nature of their relationship and the roles they played, as clearly shown in the 
above given examples.  With altered expectations, the kasamá system could not anymore function as it 
had in the past and the injustices it came to be associated with eventually brought dissatisfaction and 
unrest.   
The breakdown of relations between landlords and tenant-farmers may be viewed as the result of 
a social paradigm shift.  While traditional relations remained, new meanings were assigned to traditional 
roles.  Expectations were also altered as the norms conformed to the new standards.  The kasamá 
system was therefore outgrown by landlords and share tenants, a casualty of changing times.  
CONCLUSION 
The present study demonstrateswhy it is necessary to adopt a broader perspective to understand 
the reasons forthe outbreak of agrarian unrest in the 1920s and 1930s in Central Luzon.  As presented in 
this study, while inherent defects of the kasamá system led to the deterioration of the relationship 
between landlords and share tenants, external factors simultaneously added pressure to the already 
volatile situation.  It was the convergence of such forces that ultimately caused the breakdown of 
landlord and tenant relations that led to the collapse of peace and order in Nueva Ecija and the rest of 
Central Luzon. 
By mid-twentieth century, Central Luzon was still the hotbed of social unrest in the country but by 
then organized peasants had gained sufficient strength to seriously threaten the Republic.72 This led the 
state to embark on a series of agrarian reform programs that endeavored to bring an end to landlord 
dominance in the countryside, paving the way for the redistribution of land to the masses and the 
alteration of their relationship with the landlords, an effort that continues to this day.  Through such 
reform, the prevalence of the kasamá system and the age of landlord supremacy ended.73 
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